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Educational administration has a disreputable history. Originating in the early 
twentieth century from the coalescence of the Municipal Reform Movement, 
The Cult of Professionalism and Scientific Management (Bates, 1983) it has, 
from the beginning, been concerned with efficiency, accountability and 
control. Despite the attempts of Dewey, Kilpatrick and Counts to shape a 
commitment to education that rested on the values of community, democracy 
and social progress, educational administration continued its pursuit of a 
value free science of management throughout the century. Despite damning 
criticisms such as Ray Callahan’s Cult of Efficiency (1962) and Arthur Wise’s 
Legislated Learning (1979) the pursuit of a science of educational 
administration continued unhindered by any educational, social or ethical 
concerns.  Despite the attempts of Greenfield (1975), Foster (1986) and 
others (Bates, 1983, 1987) to redefine educational administration as a 
normative and cultural process concerned with the management of 
knowledge, culture and life chances, mainstream educational administration 
(Boyan, 1988) ignored both criticisms and opportunities. At the end of the 
century, as at the beginning, administration in education, as elsewhere was 
concerned with performativity (Ball, 1994). Olssen, Codd and O’Neill (2004) 
catch the tenor of the times in their account of how schools  
 
…became increasingly preoccupied with recording and reporting. 
Efficiency not only had to be done, but it had to be seen to be done. 
Efficiency was to be continually demonstrated through the incessant 
production of records and reports. Educational cost accounting became 
the order of the day. Teachers were required to keep records, 
accounting for every hour and every day of the week. Administrators 
were forever occupied in writing reports and policy statements. 
Needless to say, there was less and less time for teaching, and 
schools became places of tedium, ritualistic order and bland routine. 
Ironically, they became less and less efficient in an educational 
sense…The cult of efficiency had become the cult of managerialism… 
(p191) 
 
In its contemporary form such managerialism has replaced the mantra of 
‘efficiency’ with that of ’quality’.  
 
Quality has become a powerful new metaphor for new forms of 
managerial control. Thus, in the pursuit of quality, educational 
institutions must engage in ‘objective setting’, ‘planning’, ‘reviewing’, 
‘internal monitoring’ and ‘external reporting’. Policy formation and 
operational activities must be clearly separated. Governance, 
management and operations are all distinct functions assigned to 
different roles. The quality of education is reduced to key performance 
indicators, each of which can be measured and reported.  
 
(Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004: 191) 
 
If, at the beginning of the twentieth century the separation of conception from 
execution was a pillar of FW Taylor’s (1911) scientific management designed 
to extract the maximum amount of production from even the stupidest worker, 
 Bates: AARE 2004 Developing Capabilities 
3 
at the end of the century neo-liberal management was designed to shackle 
the normative and potentially subversive interests and enthusiasms of service 
workers (including those that used to be called professionals) in order to 
guarantee the standardised performance of allocated tasks. 
 
Neoliberal policy strategies are founded upon a conception of the 
person that is self-serving, competitive, and likely to be dishonest. It is 
a conception that underpins proposals to separate policy formation and 
advice from policy implementation, or the separation of funder from 
provider. In this, while neoliberalism values efficiency, effectiveness 
and control, it devalues interpersonal trust. 
(Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004:192) 
 
Indeed, the devaluing of personal and institutional trust is seen by many to be 
characteristic of contemporary society. As Onora O’Neill (2002) suggests 
 
…trusting often seems hard and risky. Every day we read of 
untrustworthy action by politicians and officials, by hospitals and exam 
boards, by companies and schools. We supposedly face a deepening 
crisis of trust. Every day we also read of aspirations and attempts to 
make business and professionals, public servants and politicians more 
accountable in more ways to more stakeholders. But can a revolution 
in accountability remedy our ‘crisis of trust’? 
(O’Neill, 2002:4) 
 
O’Neill’s answer is a pretty clear ‘No’. The answer is ‘No’ because of what 
seems to be a built in paradox. Accountability procedures are designed to 
increase not only efficiency but also reliability; to eliminate unnecessary 
expense but guarantee performance.  
 
The diagnosis of a crisis of trust may be obscure: we are not sure 
whether there is a crisis of trust. But we are all agreed about the 
remedy. It lies in prevention and sanctions. Government, institutions 
and professionals should be made more accountable. And in the last 
two decades, the quest for greater accountability has penetrated all our 
lives, like great draughts of Heineken, reaching parts that supposedly 
less developed forms of accountability did not reach. 
(O’Neill, 2004:45) 
 
Inevitably, such accountability involves greater regulation and greater 
intrusion into the activities of institutions, agencies and individuals.  
 
For those of us in the public sector the new accountability takes the 
form of detailed control. An unending stream of new legislation and 
regulation, memoranda and instructions, guidance and advice floods 
into public sector institutions….Central planning may have failed in the 
Soviet Union  but it is alive and well in Britain today. The new 
accountability culture aims at ever more perfect administrative control 
of institutional and professional life. 
(O’Neill, 2002:46 itals added) 
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Ostensibly this ever more perfect control is designed to make institutions, 
firms and professionals more transparent and directly accountable for their 
actions: to provide guarantees of service to the public. One problem however 
is that the multiplication of agencies and accountabilities produces precisely 
the distractions and confusions that Callahan and Wise described. Indeed, as 
Wise (1979) suggested such multiplication of what may be  individually 
defensible but are, in practice, often mutually contradictory accountabilities 
produces a ‘hyper-rationalisation’ which confuses and overburdens institutions 
and individuals alike. We are repeating the mistakes that history should have 
taught us to avoid. 
 
But this is only one of the paradoxes. The other is that while such 
accountability is presented as increasing accountability of institutions and 
individuals to the public, in reality it does no such thing. 
 
In theory the new culture of accountability and audit makes 
professionals and institutions more accountable to the public. This is 
supposedly done by publishing targets and levels of attainment in 
league tables, and by establishing complaint procedures by which 
members of the public can seek redress for any professional or 
institutional failures. But underlying this ostensible aim of accountability 
to the public the real requirements are for accountability to regulators, 
to departments of government, to funders, to legal standards.  
 
(O’Neill, 2002:52-3) 
 
But regulators, departments of government, funders and legislative authorities 
are themselves institutions in which the public has limited trust. Who guards 
the guardians is not a question with an obvious answer. 
 
Even were there some straightforward way to make institutions accountable to 
the public another problem presents itself. There is not in fact one public but 
many. The notion of the ‘public sphere’ is subject to quite considerable 
theoretical and practical (political) controversy around this issue. As McKee 
(2004) points out, arguments between modernists (who advocate a single 
public sphere so as to ensure social and cultural integrity) and post-
modernists (who advocate multiple interacting public spheres so as to 
acknowledge social and cultural diversity) are alive and well. Here the 
question of ‘voice’ seems to be important. Who has the right to be heard? And 
in this question we arrive at the heart of the issue of democracy, 
accountability and social justice for 
 
The issue of ‘democratic inclusiveness’ is not just a quantitative matter 
of the scale of the public sphere or the proportion of the members of a 
political community who may speak within it. While it is clearly a matter 
of stratification and boundaries (for example, openness to the 
propertyless, the uneducated, women or immigrants) it is also a matter 
of how the public sphere incorporates and recognizes the diversity of 
identities which people bring to it from their manifold involvements in 
civil society. It is a matter of whether in order to participate in such a 
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public sphere, for example, women must act in ways previously 
characteristic of men and avoid addressing certain topics defined as 
appropriate to the private sphere…All attempts to render a single public 
discourse authoritative privilege certain topics, certain forms of speech 
and certain speakers… 
(Calhoun, 1996: 456-457 in McKee, 204:28) 
 
 
Here, of course, we are talking about issues such as stratification and 
exclusion and of how the concerns of the marginalised or excluded come to 
be part of the public sphere. The idea of ‘counterpublics’ is useful here. 
Counterpublics are groups of similar interest within which arguments can be 
developed to the point that they can invade and colonise the wider public 
sphere. Fraser provides an example from the feminist counterpublic. 
 
…until quite recently feminists were in the minority in thinking that 
domestic violence against women was a matter of common concern 
and thus a legitimate topic of public discourse. The great majority of 
people considered this issue to be a private matter between what was 
presumed to be a fairly small number of heterosexual couples (and 
perhaps the social and legal professions who were supposed to deal 
with them). Then, feminists formed a subaltern counterpublic from 
which we disseminated a view of domestic violence as a widespread 
systematic feature of male dominated societies. Eventually, after 
sustained discursive contestation, we succeeded in making it a 
common concern. 
(Fraser, 1990:71 in McKee, 2004: 163) 
 
Education, as Freire (1970) pointed out so powerfully, is intimately involved in 
just such a process.  In one of the few contemporary analyses of the intimate 
(but often unacknowledged) relationship between educational administration 
and social justice Larson and Murthada argue that 
 
[While]…Freire’s treatise on educating oppressed populations had 
been used widely in curriculum theory… leadership theorists have 
largely overlooked it. Nevertheless, Freire’s arguments are as relevant 
to leadership as they are to teaching and learning. 
(2002:146) 
 
In particular, Freire’s analysis suggests that  
 
… many well-intentioned leaders maintain institutionalised inequity 
because they are committed to hierarchical logics that not only fail to 
question established norms but keep impoverished citizens out of 
decision making. 
 
(Larson & Murtadha 2002:146. See also Larson & Ovando, 2001) 
The consequence is that 
 
 Bates: AARE 2004 Developing Capabilities 
6 
Because poor and minority populations have learned to mistrust many 
public leaders, well-intentioned school leaders often have difficulty in 
earning their trust and cooperation. Friere explains that the lack of trust 
poor communities show to those who lead public institutions can be 
interpreted as an ‘inherent defect’ in poor people, ‘evidence of their 
intrinsic deficiency’. Since leaders need the cooperation of those they 
lead, educators can be tempted to resort to many of the same 
hierarchical and controlling practices used by dominant elites to 
oppress those they lead. 
(Larson & Murtadha, 2002:147) 
 
 
But such a withdrawal into a coercive form of leadership is not the only option 
for, as Freire argues 
 
The role of leaders is to consider seriously the reasons for mistrust on 
the part of oppressed populations, and to seek out true avenues of 
communion… helping the people to help themselves critically perceive 
the reality which oppresses them. 
 
(Freire, 1970:163 in Larson and Murtadha, 2002:147) 
 
 
And indeed there seem to be plenty of oppressed people around for, as 
Amartya Sen suggests, we 
 
…live in a world with remarkable deprivation, destitution and 
oppression. There are many new problems as well as old ones, 
including the persistence of poverty and unfulfilled elementary needs, 
occurrence of famines and widespread hunger, violation of elementary 
political freedoms as well as of basic liberties, extensive areas of 
neglect of the interests and agency of women, and worsening threats 
to our environment and to the sustainability of our economic and social 
lives. Many of these deprivations can be observed, in one form or 
another, in rich countries as well as poor ones. 
 
(Sen, 1999:xi) 
 
Sen’s response to this situation is to insist on the intimate connection between 
individual agency (freedom) and social commitment. 
 
…individual agency is, ultimately, central to addressing these 
deprivations. On the other hand, the freedom of agency that we 
individually have is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, 
political and economic opportunities that are available to us. There is a 
deep complimentarity between individual agency and social 
arrangements. It is important to give simultaneous recognition to the 
centrality of individual freedom and to the force of social influences on 
he extent and reach of individual freedom. To counter the problems 
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that we face, we have to see individual freedom as a social 
commitment. 
 
(Sen, 1999:xi-xii) 
 
Social justice is then, in Sen’s view, a matter of arranging our social 
commitments in ways that enhance individual freedom to live a valued life. 
 
…in analysing social justice, there is a strong case for judging 
individual advantage in terms of the capabilities that a person has, that 
is, the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life 
that he or she has reason to value. 
(Sen, 1999:87) 
 
Capabilities, and the enhancement of individual capabilities through social 
arrangements, are at the heart of the issue of social justice. Sen, offers five 
‘types of freedom’ or capabilities as being fundamental: 
 
These include (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social 
opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security. 
 
(Sen, 1999:10) 
 
 
Such capabilities are mutually supportive and both ends and means of  
individual and social development. 
 
But while Sen gives a general outline (1999:38-40) and provides considerable 
empirical data in support of his analysis he declines to give a specific content 
to these capabilities.  
 
This is a point of criticism by Nussbaum (2000, 2003) who argues that while 
 
…I endorse these arguments…I think that they do not take us very far 
in thinking about social justice. They give us a general sense of what 
societies ought to be striving to achieve, but because of Sen’s 
reluctance to make commitments about substance (which capabilities a 
society ought most centrally to pursue), even that guidance remains 
but an outline. And they give us no sense of what a minimum level of 
capability for a just society might be. 
 
(Nussbaum, 2003:35) 
 
Nussbaum’s solution is to give specific content to the capabilities advocated 
by Sen. 
 
…the capabilities approach will supply definite and useful 
guidance…only if we formulate a definite list of the most central 
capabilities, even one that is tentative and revisable, using capabilities 
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so defined to elaborate a partial account of social justice, a set of basic 
entitlements without which no society can lay claim to justice. 
(Nussbaum, 2003:36) 
 
Moreover: 
 
These ten capabilities are supposed to be general goals that can be 
further specified by the society in question, as it works on the account 
of fundamental entitlements it wishes to endorse (Nussbaum 2000, Ch 
1). But in some form all are part of a minimum account of social justice: 
a society that does not guarantee these to all its citizens, at some 
appropriate threshold level, falls short of being a fully just society, 
whatever its level of opulence. Moreover, the capabilities are held to be 
important for each and every person: each person is treated as an end, 
and none as a mere adjunct or means to the ends of others. 
 
(Nussbaum, 2003:40) 
 
Nussbaum’s list of Central Human Functional Capabilities is: 1) Life, 2) Bodily 
Health, 3) Bodily Integrity, 4) Senses, Imagination and Thought, 5) Emotions, 
6) Practical Reason, 7) Affiliation, 8) Other Species, 9) Play and 10) Control 
over One’s Environment (for Nussbaum’s outline of these capabilities see 
Appendix 1).  Of these capabilities two are of particular importance. 
 
…Practical Reason and Affiliation stand out as of special importance, 
since they both organize and suffuse all others, making their pursuit 
truly human.To take just one example, work, to be a truly human mode 
of functioning, must involve the availability of both practical reason and 
affiliation. It must involve being able to behave as a thinking being, not 
just a cog in a machine; and it must be capable of being done with and 
towards others in a way that involves mutual recognition of humanity. 
 
(Nussbaum, 2000:82) 
 
Whether one accepts Sen’s broad definitions of capabilities or Nussbaum’s 
elaborated list, the connection between capabilities – seen as the facilitating 
factors that allow individuals to live the kind of life they have reason to value- 
and the notion of social justice is clear. 
 
What is not immediately clear is how responsibility for the development of 
such capabilities can be allocated. Individuals must bear some of the 
responsibility, but so must institutions. Nussbaum argues that 
 
One question that must certainly be confronted is the question of how 
to allocate the duties of promoting the capabilities, in a world that 
contains nations, economic agreements and agencies, other 
international agreements and agencies, corporations and individual 
people. To say that “we all” have the duties is all very well, and true. 
But it would be good if we could go further, saying at least something 
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about the proper allocation of duties between individuals and 
institutions, and among institutions of various kinds. 
 
(Nussbaum, 2002: 19) 
 
Moreover, as institutions have capacities that individuals do not have, they 
must also take more responsibility for the support and development of 
capabilities. 
 
…it is possible to argue cogently that institutions have both cognitive 
and causal powers that individuals do not have, powers that are 
pertinent to the allocation of responsibility. …[N]ations and corporations 
have powers of prediction and foresight that individuals in isolation do 
not have. It seems plausible that such facts give us a further reason to 
think of the responsibilities for promoting human capabilities as 
institutional. 
 
(Nussbaun, 2002: 20) 
 
Sen has a similar view. 
 
Individuals live and operate in a world of institutions. Our opportunities 
and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist and how they 
function. Not only do institutions contribute to our freedoms, their roles 
can be sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to our 
freedom. To see development as freedom provides a perspective in 
which institutional assessment can systematically occur. 
 
(Sen, 1999:142) 
 
Which brings us back to the issues of administration, specifically educational 
administration. 
 
 
If the above argument holds then there is an intimate relationship between 
social justice (seen as the equitable promotion of human capabilities) and the 
administration of institutions. Institutions can be held to account for their 
contribution to (or denial of) social justice in terms of their contribution to the 
development and extension of haman capabilities. This is a somewhat 
different and more complex notion of accountability than that (rather perverse) 
form outlined by O’Neill. It is also particularly apposite for the calling of 
education to account.  
 
Rather than the narrow and distorting forms of accountability currently 
demanded through standardized tests and performance audits1 the 
capabilities perspective demands that the role of education in promoting the 
full range of human capabilities be considered and acted upon. This is both a 
                                                
1 For accounts of the devastating effects of such forms of accountability see McNeil, 2000 and 
Elliott et al, 2004) 
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curricular responsibility and a pedagogical one: curricular, in the sense that 
the drive towards fuller development of human capabilities requires a 
curriculum appropriately shaped towards achieving such ends in particular 
circumstances; pedagogical, in the sense that the circumstances that students 
bring to the educational context must be taken into account in the teaching 
relationship. Larson and Murtadha capture these requirements rather well in 
their description of the person education should be aiming to encourage. Such 
a person, they say 
 
Should be capable of practical reason, being able to form a conception 
of the good life and to engage in critical reflection about planning one’s 
life. This also means being able to recognize and live with concern for 
other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction, to 
laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities, to imagine the situation of 
another and to have compassion for that person, and to have the 
capacity for both justice and friendship. 
 
(Larson and Murtadha, 2002:155) 
 
Such accomplishments are not notably the subject of high stakes testing! 
 
And, of course, such concerns have traditionally been excluded from the 
province of educational administration through the separation of departments 
of ‘Leadership’ from departments of curriculum and instruction. But surely 
leadership cannot be divorced from an appropriate conception of how a ‘good 
education; is to be achieved through the mechanisms of curriculum and 
instruction. And a good education in terms of the above argument, must be 
intimately related to ideas of social justice. This being so, the whole condition 
of students lives is an essential consideration, not simply their academic 
performance. 
 
For educational leaders, a focus on capabilities as worthy educational 
goals necessitates promoting a greater measure of equality than exists 
among most schools struggling with the legacies of racism, sexism and 
classism. This approach suggests that if children receive educational 
and material support, they can become fully capable of human action 
and expression. Freedom from violence, unconditional support, and 
concern for health and nutrition are educational considerations beyond 
today’s hollow and entirely insufficient demands for improving 
academic achievement. 
(Larson & Murtadha, 2002:155) 
 
To be fair to the field of educational administration, more than one voice is 
currently being raised with such goals in sight. Murphy (2002) for instance 
argues that principals must become ‘moral stewards’ whose actions are 
‘anchored in issues such as justice, community and schools that function for 
all children and youth’ (2002:75).  Just what constitutes social justice is 
however, left rather open.  
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More powerfully Furman and Starratt (2002) link the pursuit of social justice 
through education with the reinvigoration of democratic community. Drawing 
on Apple and Beane (1995) they argue that the central concerns of 
democratic, socially just schools include 
 
1. The open flow of ideas, regardless of their popularity, that enables 
people to be as fully informed as possible; 
2. The use of critical reflection and analysis to evaluate ideas, 
problems and policies; 
3. Concern for others and the “common good’; 
4. Concern for the dignity and rights of individuals and minorities 
(Furman and Starratt, 2002:106) 
 
Starratt  works this thesis out more fully in his recent book (2003), concluding 
that educational administrators have a vastly more responsible role than that 
allocated to them by functionalist accounts of educational administration that 
limit them to the management of efficiency, accountability, perfomance  and 
control. For Starratt educational administrators 
 
… are called upon to assume the role of citizens taking responsibility to 
work together to make our world a better place: more human, more 
just, more civil, and more in harmony with our natural environment. In 
other words, we are accountable to both our ancestors who struggled 
to create the world we live in and to our progeny who must live with the 
public choices we collectively make. Thus, our accountability is not 
simply a legal concern, not simply an academic concern, not, indeed, 
simply a social concern to protect children. Our accountability is also a 
moral concern to bring the work of learning to bear on our collective 
responsibilities. 
 
(Starratt, 2003: 228-229) 
 
Bringing the work of learning to bear on our collective responsibilities is surely 
the pre-eminent task of educators and educational administrators. Seen within 
the context of a capabilities approach, such a charge might go far to redress 
the damage done by decades of educational administration informed by a 
woefully inadequate understanding of both education and administration and 
of their necessary links to the pursuit of social justice. 
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APPENDIX ! 
 
The Central Human Capabilities  
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or 
before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately 
nourished; to have adequate shelter.  
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, 
including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for 
choice in matters of reproduction.  
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – 
and to do these things in a ‘‘truly human’’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate 
education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific 
training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing 
works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use 
one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and 
artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to 
avoid nonbeneficial pain.  
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those 
who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience 
longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and 
anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to 
be crucial in their development.)  
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious 
observance.)  
7. Affiliation.  
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, 
to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. 
(Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of 
affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)  
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.  
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world 
of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
10. Control Over One’s Environment.  
 
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having 
the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.  
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights 
on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; 
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human 
being, exercising practical reason, and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition 
with other workers.  
(From Nussbaum, 2003: 41-42) 
